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Jafarwhose debriefing accounts have been known to varyalso doubted Saddam understood the technical specifications of the tubes.
ISG found that Iraqi educational institutions accepted equipment eddigi euro lotto számok salvaged from the pre-1991 program, but we are unable to show that universities played a role in any renewed Iraqi nuclear weapons effort.
In addition, the Iraqis wanted the experience and knowledge that would eventually come with operating the lines.According to reporting, in late 2002 or early 2003, the lead production engineer provided a representative of the Syrian-based Awad Amora Company with the same high-specification requirements for tubes as had been used with other prospective parate reporting confirms the Awad Amora procurement attempt, noting.In 2001/2002, following meetings with Saddam, Al-Janabi and.New departments were established in the Physics Department of the iaec.Similarly, the head of Iraqs pre-1991 centrifuge program reportedly had no knowledge of a nuclear connection to the aluminum tubes until the issue surfaced months before Operation Iraqi Freedom.Rail gun equipment and materials uncovered by ISG similarly do not appear to have been part of a nuclear weapons design and development effort, even though a few itemswith further developmenthad the potential of supporting such work.Some 66 boxes of documentation and a large quantity of electronic media were collected and subsequently handed over to ISG for translation and exploitation (see Main Survey Procedure section and Results).Top of page Laser Research in Iraq The Iraqi government at the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom was supporting laser research and development work in military and industrial magic casino kulmbach öffnungszeiten applications.The facility was destroyed by iaea in April-June 1992.Most of the major buildings at Tarmiya were extensively damaged by coalition air strikes during Desert Storm.The head of design implementation in the former centrifuge program, Faris Abd Al Aziz Al Samarrai, did not believe that there was a reconstituted nuclear weapons program in Iraq after 1991.The Iraqis stated that on the site approximately 90,000 tubes were classified as rejected tubes or tubes that did not pass prescribed testing.ISG believes that bureaucratic momentum made it difficult to abandon the perceived need for high-specification tubes from abroad.
Tilfah stated, however, that he was not aware of any LIS-related laser work being conducted at these institutions.

Another source indicates these aluminum tubes reportedly were flow-formed to a diameter of about.5 mm then machined to their final dimensions.Hazard Warnings, tropical Cyclone Track, wind Vector Forecast 24h, max.Additionally, Baqi noted quality control was a general problem with the 81-mm rocket program.The pre-1991 Iraqi nuclear program was able to successfully test a magnetically supported rotor.Husayn Kamil, Director of MIC and mimi, assumed control of the Iraqi Nuclear Program.Bomb damage in 1991 destroyed the uranium extraction facility at the Al Qaim Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant.Tuwaitha Maps, Buildings, and Numbers, key Findings, iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraqs ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date.Other sections of ISG nuclear report describe findings concerning equipment and materials that could have supported a renewed centrifuge effort.Hamzas laser project was transferred to the Optical Center, and Hamza became one of the Centers Group Leaders.ISG has found, however, that the Al Quds Companya new MIC establishment created in 2002had a technical department, which built an explosive test facility capable of conducting research.
Debriefings of Iraqis associated with the rail gun project and captured documents reveal the following former PC-3 personnel were connected to the effort:.
A letter from Maj.